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While competition policy acts to maintain the quality of consumers’ options, 
consumer  protection  policy  acts  to  provide  the  conditions  for  the  effective 
exercise  of  consumers’  choice  over  those  options  (Sylvan  2004).  The  links 
between the two policies are clear, and yet, the interface between the two has 
largely  been  ignored  by  economists,  despite  both  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission  and  the  UK’s  Office  of  Fair  Trading  recently  stressing  its 
importance1 (Muris 2002 and Vickers 2003). In this paper, we consider the 
interface with regard to a specific form of price advertising.  
 
Firms  often  provide  in-store  price  advertising  in  the  form  of  price 
comparisons  relative  to  a  past  own  price  (“Was  $9.99,  Now  $6.99”),  a 
recommended  retail  price  (“RRP  $9.99,  Now  $6.99”),  a  competitors’  price 
(“Seller X $9.99, Here $6.99”) or in some implicit comparison (“Sale $6.99”, 
“Low Price $6.99”, “Only $6.99”). While previous research has focussed on 
the  impact  of  these  comparisons  on  (reference-dependent)  consumers’ 
willingness  to  pay  (Thaler  1985,  Putler  1992),  we  consider  their  impact  on 
(rational) consumer search.  
 
Until  recently,  in  some  countries  such  as  France  and  Germany,  consumer 
protection authorities had banned price comparisons, while in countries such 
as  the  UK  and  US,  the  authorities  have  always  made  them  subject  to 
monitoring and regulation2. This paper aims to understand the mechanisms, 
and the extent to which, such consumer protection policies affect competition 
and consumer welfare.   
 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions include Beales et al (1981), Vickers (2003) and several strands within the 
product quality literature concerning the issues of licensing, certification or disclosure (see 
Carlton and Perloff 1999, for a review). 
2  Bans  were  applied  in  some  European  countries  until  the  EU  Directive  (97/55/EC). 
harmonised  policies  in  2000.  For  the  US  and  UK  approach  see  the  FTC’s  Guide  Against 
Deceptive Pricing at www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/decptprc.htm and the Code of Practice for 
Traders  on  Price  Indications  at  www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/guide/misleadingprice.pdf. 
See Barigozzi and Peitz (2004) for a discussion of comparative advertising policies. 
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To do so, we present a duopoly model where firms select prices (possibly 
from  mixed  strategies)  and  then  have  the  opportunity  to  make  a  price 
comparison to all those consumers who enter their store. In the benchmark 
case,  we  show  that  either  banning  price  comparisons  or  providing  no 
regulation  at  all,  leaves  consumers’  search  decisions  and  the  market 
equilibrium unaffected. However, the introduction of a consumer protection 
policy  that  monitors  and  withdraws  a  fraction  of  all  false  comparisons 
produces two effects. The first effect, the ‘competition effect’ makes the market 
more transparent and stimulates fiercer price competition, while the second, 
adverse  effect,  the  ‘deterrence  effect’,  allows  firms  to  anti-competitively  use 
false price comparisons to deter, otherwise optimal consumer search.  
 
The existence of a deterrence effect is notable in several regards. Firstly, it 
provides a rare characterisation of the deception of rational agents. Indeed, it 
provides  a  formalisation  of  Nelson’s  (1974)  conjecture  that  ‘moderately 
enforced regulation’ may allow firms to deceive consumers by providing a 
source of credibility for false claims, while not fully dissuading firms from 
using  them.  Secondly,  it  suggests  (false)  price  comparisons  can  have  anti-
competitive effects that run counter to the conventional effects of (truthful) 
price advertising.  
 
To further analyse the effects of consumer protection monitoring, we then go 
on  to  show  that  despite  possibly  facilitating  search  deterrence,  the  pro-
competitive effects of increased monitoring are so large that no increase in 
monitoring can ever reduce consumer welfare. With regard to this specific 
context, we therefore suggest, that it was indeed correct to remove the ban on 
comparative advertising, and that there exists no conflict of interests between 
consumer protection and competition authorities. 
 
In  section  2,  we  review  some  related  literature,  before  we  move on  to  the 
model in section 3. The paper’s main results are given in section 4 and their       
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implications for policy in section 5. Section 6 considers the external validity 
and robustness of the model. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Some Evidence and Related Literature  
 
At this point, some readers may instinctively disagree with the notion that 
firms may deceive consumers with the use of false price comparisons.  Before 
reviewing the relevant literature, we therefore aim to support this notion by  
i) outlining some successful prosecutions to suggest that firms do indeed use 
false comparisons, and ii) reviewing the field and experimental evidence in 
marketing, that suggests false price comparison can have significant effects on 
consumer behaviour.  
 
Recent  prosecutions  in  the  UK  include  a  case  in  2003  against  a  DIY  and 
furniture chain, MFI, for offences including advertising a saving of 50% on a 
range of kitchens, when in fact, the actual saving was found to be only 8%3. 
Similarly,  Mark  One,  a  clothing  retailer  was  fined  £3000  in  2000  after  an 
investigation found a number of in-store signs suggesting “Many Items Now 
Up to 75% Off” when in fact the majority of stocks were discounted by far less 
than this4. In 2001, one of the main supermarket chains, Asda, was prosecuted 
after making claims that prices were even lower than normal - "Roll back now 
even  lower",  when  in  fact  such  comparisons  had  been  made  to  outdated 
prices5,  while  a  clothing  store,  The  Officers  Club,  was  prosecuted  in  2005, 
after  the  firm  offered  an  insufficient  level  of  products  at  the  advertised 
discount  of  “70%  off  everything”6.  In  the  US,  the  recent  approach  to 
regulation seems to have been more relaxed, but Grewal and Compeau (1992) 
document  several  past  cases  involving  department  stores  making  inflated 
prices comparisons - State of Maryland vs. The Hecht Co. (1985), State of New 
York vs. Sears, Roebuck and Company (1989), State of New York vs. Sibley, 
Lindsay and Curr Co. (1990), and Colorado vs. May Department Stores (1990).  
                                                 
3 Consumer Affairs Newsletter, Summer 2003, Leicester Trading Standards 
4 Brent and Harrow Trading Standards Press Release 20 July 2000.  
5 BBC news website, www.bbc.co.uk, September 2001 
6 OFT Press Release May 2005       
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Numerous  experimental  and  field  experiments  within  the  marketing 
literature  have  supported  the  notion  that  price  comparisons  can  reduce 
consumers’  estimates  of  the  benefits  of  further  search  and/or  inflate 
consumers’  willingness  to  pay.  Typical  evidence,  starting  with  Blair  and 
Landon  (1981)  randomly  assigned  subjects  to  one  of  several  constructed 
advertisements  and  asked  them  for  their  pre-  and  post-advertisement 
intentions, but more persuasive evidence has measured consumers’ reactions 
more  realistically.  Urbany  et  al  (1988)  observed  consumers’  responses  in  a 
laboratory market setting, while Anderson and Simester’s (2001) remarkable 
field experiment involved the careful manipulation of comparisons made in a 
real-life  firms’  clothing  catalogue.  Typically,  results  suggest  that  a  price 
comparison itself, regardless of the actual selling price can generate increased 
demand and reduce search intentions. Indeed, after providing a meta-analysis 
of the empirical evidence Compeau and Grewal (1998) conclude, “Evidence 
indicates  that  comparative  price  advertising  is  a  powerful  advertising  tool 
with  a  strong  opportunity  for  deception  that  requires  careful  management 
and monitoring”7. 
 
Despite a wealth of empirical research, theoretical treatments of these effects 
in  market  contexts  are  rare.  Anderson  and  Simester  (1998),  from  the 
perspective of marketing science, consider the optimal number of sales signs a 
multi-product firm should use across its range of products. Firms compete 
over fashion products by each offering a range of new and old products each 
season. Due to the exogenous assumptions of the model, firms find it optimal 
to lower the price of each product when it becomes old. Instead of potentially 
using  sales  signs  on  all  of  its  new  and  old  products,  a  firm  is  shown  to 
optimally  limit  the  number  of  signs  and  to  prefer  placing  the  signs  on 
genuinely low priced goods. A consumer, who enters a store not knowing 
whether a given product will be discounted in the future or not, can then 
                                                 
7 Also see the UK’s Office of Fair Trading’s (2005) research which provides a comprehensive 
review of their own and other evidence, and Inman et al (1990) and Inman and McAlister 
(1993) who document similar “promotion signalling” effects.        
Page 6 
(probabilistically) trust sales signs to inform their decision of whether to buy 
immediately or not. Our model differs to theirs in several important respects. 
Firstly,  and  most  importantly,  the  focus  of  our  model  is  on  the  impact  of 
policy  and  the  implications  for  competition  and  welfare,  rather  than 
marketing. Secondly, rather than relying on exogenous assumptions to create 
a  special  case  of  dynamic  price  discrimination,  the  firms  in  our  model 
compete  within  a  more  general  search-theoretic  framework  so  that  price 
dispersion is generated endogenously.  
 
Our model can also be seen to contribute to a wider literature that considers 
how firms may manipulate consumer search in order to gain market power. 
Firms can soften market competition by not only trying to deter search, as in 
the case considered here, but also to distort it. Firms may use, what Ellison 
and Ellison (2004) refer to as obfuscation strategies, to make search difficult or 
confusing for consumers. The authors specifically consider the use of add-on 
prices that make search more costly by distorting search engine results while 
also  discussing  how  firms  may  add  (meaningless)  product  dimensions  or 
create  complex  tariffs,  in  order  to  make  comparisons  between  products 
cognitively difficult8. In a different sense, Spiegler (2005) shows the incentive 
for firms to distort effective search by increasing the variance across product 
quality dimensions. Ireland (2002) considers a how firms may undermine the 
effectiveness  of  consumer  search  by  reducing  the  chance  of  a  consumer 
sampling a genuinely different, lower priced firm by filling the market with 
different named stores that are in fact owned by the same firm. 
 
 
3. A Model of Price Comparisons and Consumer Protection 
 
The model considers a duopoly where both firms sell a single good of known 
quality. Production costs and capacity constraints are set to zero and so we 
can denote firm i’s profits as  i i i q p = p   } 2 , 1 { = "i . Without loss of generality, 
                                                 
8 See Wilson and Waddams Price (2005) for evidence of substantial decision errors made by 
consumers when switching between suppliers in the UK electricity market that may have 
been accentuated by the industry’s use of complex tariffs.       
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the number of consumers is normalised to two,  } 2 , 1 { = k , and both consumers 
have unit demand functions with a maximum willingness to pay of V >0. The 
consumers are located symmetrically such that consumer 1 is ‘local’ to firm 1 
and consumer 2 is ‘local’ to firm 2. For a consumer k who is local to firm i, it is 
assumed  that  the  consumer  may  costlessly  visit  firm  i,  but  must  pay  a 
subsequent search cost c >0 to visit the non-local firm, firm i j ¹ 9. We assume 
that  returning  to  the  local  firm  after  searching  the  non-local  firm  is 
prohibitively expensive - search is without recall (although the model is not 
dependent upon this assumption, see section 6). The game is comprised of 
four  stages,  and  is  only  played  once.  All  agents  are  risk-neutral  and  fully 
rational with orthodox preferences. 
 
In Stage 1, both firms simultaneously select a selling price, 
+ Â Î i p  , which 
remains fixed for the rest of the game.  In equilibrium  i p will be drawn from a 
(perhaps degenerate) probability distribution,  ) ( i p F  defined on a (perhaps 
discontinuous) price support of with a lower and upper bound of  p  and  p . 
 
In Stage 2, only the firms observe the vector of market prices,  } , { 2 1 p p P = . 
The firms then have the opportunity to create a costless in-store message that 
will  be  viewed  by  any  consumer  who  visits  the  firm.  A  firm’s  message 
strategy  M P mi Î ) | (   assigns  a  message  i m   from  the  message  space 
} , { NoSign Sign M =  for all possible market price contingencies,  P . We focus 
only on implicit comparisons by allowing firms to either construct a sales sign 
or not. Within this simple model, this is not restrictive as we could decompose 
any  instructive  communication  to  a  binary  signal  suggesting  whether  the 
consumer could benefit from further search or not. Allowing firms to choose 
                                                 
9 The model uses a slightly unusual search framework based on Shilony (1977). The use of a 
more standard search model, such as Stahl (1989), would be inconsistent with our model’s 
requirement  that  consumers  make  costly,  sequential,  meaningful  search  decisions,  as 
consumers would either search without cost (shoppers) or make a costly search only once. 
Introducing shoppers here would simply further enhance the incentives for firms to compete.       
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over the exact content of a more explicit price comparison will be discussed in 
section 6.  
 
In Stage 3, we introduce a consumer protection authority (CPA). The CPA 
monitors  all  firms’  messages  with  an  exogenous  regulation  probability  of 
] 1 , 0 [ Î w , and will withdraw any monitored message that is false and against 
consumers’ interests. Specifically, in the context of the model, this implies that 
the  CPA  will  withdraw  any  monitored  false  sign  posted  by  firm  i  that 
suggests to the consumer that further search is not worthwhile, when in fact 
the  consumer  would  benefit  from  further  search;  when  c p p j i + > .  When 
compared  to  a  more  realistic  decision  rule  that  would  withdraw  a  sign  if 
j i p p > , this decision rule may look odd. However, under our simplifying 
assumption  of  uniform  search  costs,  this  decision  rule  provides  more  is 
preferred by consumers as it provides more meaningful information. 
 
In Stage 4, consumers enter the market and automatically observe their local 
firms’ price and message, } , { i i m p , before deciding whether to further search 
the non-local firm or not. A consumer’s optimal search strategy will consist of 
two  reservation  prices,  ) ( i m r " } , { NoSign Sign mi Î ,  which  describe  the  total 
expected cost of searching and buying from the non-local firm, conditional on 
the local firm’s message  i m . A consumer will optimally buy at the local firm if 
) ( i i m r p £ and  choose  to  make  a  further  search  if  not.  Having  further 
searched, the consumer will buy from the non-local firm j,  if V p j £ , exiting if 
not. Payoffs are then awarded. 
 
In essence, firms pick prices in stage 1 and then participate in a cheap talk 
sender-receiver  game  with  their  local  consumers,  where  messages  may  be 
mediated in some way by the CPA, in stages 2-4. 
 
In  solving  the  game,  we  will  only  consider  the  set  of  symmetric  Perfect 
Bayesian  Nash  Equilibria.  Given  the  exogenous  parameters  of  the  model,       
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} , , { w c V ,  an  equilibrium  will  consist  of  the  firm  strategies  ) ( i p F   and 
) | ( P mi P " , and the consumer strategies  ) ( i m r " } , { NoSign Sign mi Î  such that 
all players’ strategies are optimal with respect to other players’ strategies, and 
any beliefs (over the non-local price) will be derived optimally through Bayes’ 
rule.  Crucially,  as  is  standard  within  the  search  model  literature,  the 
equilibrium  definition  implies  that  a  non-local  firm  j  cannot  induce  a 
consumer at firm i to search by the choice of its unknown price or expected 
price distribution alone.  
 
 
No Regulation Equilibrium 
 
To begin our analysis we start with the benchmark case where there is no 
regulation by the CPA by finding the game equilibrium when  0 = w .  
 
Intuitively,  as  false  messages  have  neither  a  cost  nor  a  punishment,  firms 
always  prefer  consumers  to  buy  without  further  search.  All  messages  are 
therefore incredible and the consumers rationally ignore them, making any 
comparison completely ineffective at deterring search and making the firms 
indifferent over the message space. As in the case where all price comparisons 
are  banned,  consumers  are  now  left  to  make  their  costly  search  decisions 
using the ex ante expectation of non-local firms’ prices alone; only searching if 
c p E r p j i + = > ) ( . Thus, as in the Diamond paradox (1971), a firm can always 
increase profits by increasing its price by an amount less than c at any pure 
strategy  price  equilibrium  other  than  that  at  the  monopoly  price,  V. 
Consumers can do no better than to buy from their local firm and neither firm 
can  profitably  induce  search  by  reducing  its  (unknown)  price.  This  is 
formalised below. 
 
The Benchmark Case:   Given  } , { c V  and either a level of consumer protection 
regulation of  w=0 or a ban on price comparisons, there exist a unique equilibrium, 
where  firms  set  V pi = and  are  indifferent  over  the  message  space  M,  and  where 
consumers do not search, setting  = ) (Sign r = ) (NoSign r c p E j + ) ( .       
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We  now  generalise  the  model  to  incorporate  the  effects  of  consumer 
protection by finding the game equilibria for  ] 1 , 0 [ Î w . We start by finding the 
equilibrium  messaging  and  search  strategies  for  any  given  pricing 
distribution,  and  then  further  solve  for  the  equilibrium  stage  1  pricing 
strategies. 
 
Firstly, when  c p p
i + £ , the low price alone is sufficient for the consumer to 
make an optimal decision as the price is close enough to the lower bound,  p , 
to  make  search  a  dominated  strategy.  Consequently,  the  firm  becomes 
indifferent over the message space. 
 
In  contrast,  when  c p p
i + > ,  messages  may  in  principle  have  value  to  the 
consumer as search may or may not be optimal. Firms will always have an 
incentive to try to persuade the consumer to buy by setting  Sign mi =  (apart 
from  when  w=1  and  c p p
j i + >   where  the  firm  will  be  indifferent  as  any 
message will be withdrawn with certainty). Hence, a consumer who observes 
c p p
i + >  and  NoSign mi =  must rationally infer that  c p p
j i + >  as it must be 
the case that firm i created a false sales sign which was withdrawn (or the 
firm was indifferent, if  1 = w ). Using this inference, a consumer will optimally 
always  search  having  observed  no  sales  sign  as  the  expected  total  cost  of 
searching (the reservation price) will always be lower than the cost of buying 
without search as  = ) (NoSign r
i i j j p c c p p p E < + - < ) | (
i p " .  
 
If instead  c p p
i + >  and  Sign m
i = , the consumer must rationally infer that 
either the sign is truthful implying that  c p p
j i + £ , or that the sign is false but 
has  not  been  monitored,  implying  that  c p p
j i + > .  Using  Bayes’  rule,  the 
consumer will search if  ) (Sign r pi > , and buy without search if not, where 
= ) (Sign r        
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and  where  one  can  note  that  c p E Sign r j + = ) ( ) (   when  0 = w   and 
c c p p p E Sign r i j j + - ³ = ) | ( ) (  when  1 = w . 
 
Given the search and messaging strategies found above, we now solve for the 
pricing equilibrium in stage 1 by finding the equilibrium values of  p p,  and 
) (p F .  
 
We note firstly that it must be true that  } ), ( min{ V Sign r p £ , as the consumer 
will  always  prefer  to  search  or  exit  at  prices  beyond  this  upper  bound. 
Consequently,  having  observed  a  sales  sign  a  consumer  will  always  buy 
without  search.  The  expected  demand  function  for  firm  i  can  then  be 
expressed  as  in  (1)  and  understood  as  follows.  If  c p p c p j i j + £ £ -   both 
firms  can  legitimately  provide  sales  signs  and  trade  with  their  local 
consumers. However, if prices are further apart, the higher priced firm will 
provide a false sign and either gain no demand if the sign is withdrawn with 
probability w, prompting its local consumer to search elsewhere or the firm 
will successfully deter search and trade with its local consumer if the sign 
escapes monitoring, with probability (1-w). The higher priced firm gains an 
expected  demand  of  (1-w),  while  the  lower  priced  firm  gains  an  expected 
demand of (1+w). 
 
 
      if  c p p j i + >  
= ) , , , ( c w p p D j i   if  c p p c p j i j + £ £ -     (1) 
            if   c p p j i - <     
 
The discontinuities in (1) create equilibrium pricing strategies that are quite 
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When  regulation  is  ‘low’,  )] /( , 0 [ c V c w w - = Î ,  the  fraction  of  monitored 
messages is insufficient to break the Diamond monopoly pricing equilibrium. 
A price cut to (V-c) by firm j can only profitably break the equilibrium if the 
(now false) sign at firm i is withdrawn to allow firm j to attract the non-local 
consumer with a sufficiently high probability. Such a price cut will not be 
profitable when,  ) 1 )( ( w c V V + - ³  which is true when  ). /( c V c w w - = £   
  
If instead,  w w > , the increased regulation of in-store messages improves the 
transmission of information concerning the price at firm j to consumers at 
firm i, in a way that can resolve the Diamond paradox.  Higher regulation can 
allow false sales signs at firm i to be more frequently withdrawn, increasing 
the  incentives  of  firm  j  to  make  a  competitive  price  cut  to  attract  firm  i’s 
consumers.  However,  note  that  markets  with  higher  search  costs  require 
higher  levels  of  regulation  to  do  this,  and  even  perfect  regulation  is 
insufficient to break the equilibrium if  ) 2 / (V c > . When  w w > , there is no 
pure strategy pricing equilibrium as firms face incentives to both undercut 
each  other  and  to  increase  prices  by  an  amount  less  than  c.  Instead,  the 
equilibrium  pricing  strategies  consist  of  pricing  distributions,  ) (p F .  ) (p F  
will constitute an equilibrium distribution if  0 ) ( ' ³ p F   p "  and if the expected 
profits for all prices within the equilibrium price support generate a constant 
expected profit of q , while all other prices generate a profit strictly less than 
q .  
 
Given  that  both  firms  price  symmetrically  with  ) (p F ,  we  can  express 
equilibrium profits by (2) where  )) ( 1 ( c p wF - -  expresses the probability that 
firm i trades with its local consumer - one minus the chance that firm j prices c 
below  firm  i  and  that  firm  i’s  false  sign  is  withdrawn,  and  where 
)) ( 1 ( c p F w + - expresses the probability that firm i trades with its non-local 
consumers - the chance that firm i undercuts firm j by more than c multiplied 
by the probability that firm j’s false sign is withdrawn. 
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= q ))] ( 1 ( )) ( 1 [( c p F w c p wF p + - + - -     " ] , [ p p pi Î    (2) 
 
In the appendix, we continue the equilibrium derivation by essentially using 
(2) to solve for the value of equilibrium profits, the pricing distribution and 
the  equilibrium  price  support10.  This  creates  two  ‘types‘  of  mixed  pricing 
strategies  corresponding  to  when  regulation  is  ‘mid’  ] , ( w w wÎ ,  or  ‘high’ 
] 1 , (w wÎ ,  where  )) 2 ( /( )) ( 2 (( c V V c V c w - - = .  In  the  mid  regulation  case  the 
pricing  distribution  consists  of  a  price  support  with  a  dominated  middle 
region, and a mass point at prices equal to V, while in the high regulation case 
the price support is continuous and bounded below V. This, and the entire 
game equilibrium are formally stated in the equilibrium proposition below. 
 
Equilibrium Proposition:    For  a  set  of  consumer parameters  } , { c V and  a 
level of consumer protection regulation of  w, the  game has a unique equilibrium, 
where 
 
= ) (Sign r ) | ( Sign m p E i j =  and   = ) (NoSign r c c p p p E
i j j + - < ) | (  
 
= ) | ( P mi Sign " P    (Although indifferent over M when  c p pi + <  or w =1  and  c p p j i + > ) 
 
  if  p p ³    
 
   
if  ) , [ p c p p + Î  
 
   
if  ) , [ c p c p p + - Î  
 
   
 
if  ) , [ c p p p - Î  
   
if  p p <  
   
                                                 
10 The methods used in the appendix rely heavily on Shilony (1977) and indeed, our pricing 
equilibrium provides a generalisation of Shilony who characterised the special case where 
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Where  p , q and  p are defined across three regions of  w.  w is considered to be low 
when  ] , 0 [ w wÎ ,  mid  when  ] , ( w w wÎ   and  high  when ] 1 , (w wÎ ,  where 
)) /( ( c V c w - = and  )) 2 ( /( )) ( 2 (( c V V c V c w - - = . For each region, 
 
Low w:      V = q                     V p = ,       V p =  
Mid w :     ] 4 ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( )[ 2 / 1 (
2 wcV V w c V w c + - + + - + = q      c p - =q ,  V p =  
High w:     ] 1 1 )[ / (
2 w w c + + = q                 c p - =q ,   c p + =q  
 
 
To  get  a  more  intuitive  grasp  of  the  equilibrium  and  the  effects  of  price 
comparisons, we now present the model’s main results. 
 
4. Main Results 
Within the model, we are now interested in two comparative statics results. 
Firstly, we are interested in how the level of regulation affects, if at all, the 
ability of firms to deter search using false sales signs and secondly, how the 
level of regulation affects equilibrium consumer surplus. 
 
We  now  show  in  Result  1,  that  moderate  levels  of  consumer  protection 
regulation can actually facilitate search deterrence. 
 
Result 1 :   If  we  denote  the  expected  ex  ante  probability  that  a  consumer  is 
deterred from otherwise optimal search due to the presence of a false sales sign as d , 
then d  is zero at  } 1 { ] , 0 [ È Î w w , but positive on  ) 1 , (w wÎ . That is, regulation can 
facilitate search deterrence that would not otherwise exist, when ) 1 , (w wÎ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
Intuitively, when w=0 in the benchmark case, messages had no credibility and 
consumers  rationally  ignored  all  sales  signs.  Alternatively,  under  perfect 
regulation,  when  w=1,  messages  have  credibility  but  all  false  signs  are 
withdrawn by the authorities. It is only when regulation is of ‘middle-order’, 
) 1 , (w wÎ , that search deterrence can exist as the moderate level of regulation       
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provides a source of credibility for consumers but fails to fully eradicate false 
messages.  This  result  provides  an  unusual  characterisation  of  deception 
under the assumption of fully rational agents and formalises the arguments 
made by Nelson (1974), as referred to in the introduction, who stated that 
“Deception requires not only a misleading or untrue statement, but somebody ready 
to be misled by that statement” (p.749). 
 
Result 2 now goes on to show that despite the facilitation of search deterrence, 
increased  efforts  by  consumer  protection  authorities  can  never  reduce 
consumer welfare. 
 
Result 2: If we denote firms’ equilibrium profits and expected consumer welfare as 
functions  of  the  level  of  regulation  w,  as  ) (w q and  ) (w CS   respectively,  then 
0 ) ( ' £ w q " w  and  0 ) ( ' ³ w CS   " w.  That  is,  despite  any  effects  on  facilitating 
deception, firms cannot benefit and consumers cannot be harmed by any increase in 
regulation.  
 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
In essence, Result 2 can be understood best by considering the two effects that 
occur following an increase in the level of regulation.  
 
The  first  effect  documented  by  Result  1,  which  we  label  as  the  ‘deterrence 
effect’, shows that increases in regulation can facilitate search deterrence. This 
effect  reduces  consumer  surplus  by  preventing  consumers  from  optimally 
searching to benefit from buying at the lowest price on the market.   
 
The second ‘competition effect’, increases consumer surplus and dominates the 
deterrence effect by reducing the equilibrium prices available on the market. 
This effect can be understood by interpreting the expected demand function 
given in (1). A ‘winning’ firm who has selected a price which is at least c 
below  its  competitor’s  price  has  profits  that  are  increasing  in  the  level  of 
regulation, w, while the losing firm’s profits are decreasing in w and thus 
increases in regulation increase the intensity of competition.       
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The  implications  of  Result  2  for  consumer  protection  policy  are  now 
considered in the next section, while the robustness and validity of using the 
model’s results in wider contexts is discussed in section 6. 
 
 
5. Policy Implications  
 
Under the assumptions of the model, Result 2 suggests that provided neither 
search  costs  nor  the  costs  of  monitoring  are  too  large,  CPAs  can  always 
improve consumer welfare and enhance competition by increasing the level of 
monitoring.  This  also  indicates  that  the  European  Union  was  correct  to 
remove  some  countries’  bans  on  comparative  advertising  of  this  sort,  as 
banning  advertising  in  the  model  is  consistent  with  the  worst  consumer 
welfare outcome.   
 
A further implication of the model also suggests that it might be optimal to 
apply different levels of monitoring across markets that differ in the level of 
search  costs.  Markets  with  higher  search  costs  require  higher  levels  of 
monitoring to break the monopoly pricing equilibrium, while in markets with 
very high search costs, no amount of monitoring can ever improve consumer 
welfare. Such a strategy may be ultimately ineffective however, if, as a result, 
consumers become unsure about the level of regulation. For example if we 
consider an extreme case (outside the assumptions of game theory) where the 
level of regulation is not common knowledge and where consumers’ believed 
regulation  was  full  when  in  fact  it  was  zero,  then  firms  could  sustain  the 
Diamond equilibrium despite the efforts of the CPA. It is therefore advisable 
to ensure consumers are informed of the true level of regulation.  
 
Although  realistic  in  some  cases,  the  form  of  regulation  considered  in  the 
model may differ from that used by actual CPAs. For example, in the UK, 
CPAs often regulate the majority of messages after receiving a complaint from 
either a consumer or a rival firm, rather than using the random monitoring 
system considered here. Although, less costly to implement, a system based 
on consumer complaints would be ineffective in our model as no consumer       
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who observes a false sales sign ever subsequently searches to learn it is false. 
However, a system based on firm complaints could be useful as a rival firm 
would  always  have  the  incentive  to  tell  the  authorities  if  the  other  firm 
created a false sign. Such a system could therefore allow the CPA to achieve 
perfect monitoring, although there would exist a dynamic incentive for firms 
to collude not to complain to achieve a more profitable, reduced level of w.  
 
Finally,  it  is  not  clear  if  CPAs  could  benefit  from  administering  fines  in 
addition to withdrawing false price comparisons. In a previous version of this 
paper, Wilson (2004) showed some incomplete results suggesting that fines 
could act similarly to withdrawals but this remains an open policy question. 
 
 
6. Limitations and Robustness 
The  model  makes  some  simplifying  assumptions  which  may  call  into 
question the external validity of the model and the applicability of the policy 
conclusions  implications.  In  this  section,  we  discuss  the  robustness  of  the 
model.  
 
In solving the model we made use of the assumption that consumers could 
not return to the local store after searching elsewhere. This assumption is not 
crucial however, as the consumer, would never optimally return to the local 
firm,  even  if  the  consumer  had  such  an  option.  The  consumer  only  ever 
searches  after  observing  no  sales  sign,  which  implies  with  certainty  that 
c p p
j i + > . 
 
We also assume that firms are unable to create their own forms of credibility. 
Credibility  could  be  gained  through  the  usual  dynamic  signalling  or 
reputation mechanisms. One could also interpret the use of price matching 
guarantees – where firms promise to refund any difference relative to a lower 
priced rival firm found by a consumer, as a possible credibility mechanism11. 
                                                 
11  This  interpretation  is  gaining  favour  within  the  literature  after  Arbatskaya  et  al  (2004) 
found that the more common interpretation of price matching guarantees as a facilitating       
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Although these strategies are important, the qualitative effects of regulation 
are unlikely to change by incorporating them into the model. 
 
One could expand the model by considering a wider message space rather 
than  the  simple  binary  message  space.  This  could  be  handled  within  the 
model by reasonably assuming that different types of messages are open to 
different  regulation  levels.  For  example,  a  consumer  may  place  more 
credibility on message stating the exact price of firm j in relation to the price 
of firm i, as it would be much easier for a CPA to monitor and evaluate such a 
message.  Firms’  strategic  choice  across  different  types  of  messages  would 
clearly be an avenue for further research.   
 
The model disallows firms from using out-of-store advertising to advertise 
their price to the non-local firm’s consumer. Such advertising would vastly 
limit the potential for search deterrence by firms as consumers would now 
have  two  sources  of  information.  However,  it  is  not  certain  that  such 
advertising would ‘hit’ the consumer with certainty and so the model as it 
stands  could  apply  in  such  circumstances.  Further,  such  advertising  has  a 
credibility  problem  of  its  own.  The  author  is  currently  working  on  the 
implications of this in another model.  
 
Finally, the model’s timing can be criticised. It may be the case that the firm 
would like to change its price in response either to its rival’s price or to being 
caught by the CPA and yet we assume that prices must remain fixed for the 
entire  game.  This  is  a  genuine  criticism  of  the  model,  but  it  is  one  also 




Within a search-theoretic framework we have analysed how the monitoring 
of  in-store  sales  signs  by  a  consumer  protection  authority  might  influence 
                                                                                                                                            
device for collusion appeared inconsistent with their empirical evidence. Our model could 
help understand this less common interpretation. Moorthy and Winter (2002) have made a 
different start in this direction.       
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consumers’ search decisions and market competitiveness. Despite, facilitating 
an effect that deters optimal search, we have shown that monitoring is always 
preferred  to  a  ban  on  comparisons  and  that  increases  in  monitoring  can 
always improve competition and consumer welfare   (provided search and 
monitoring costs are not too large). 
 
While  this  paper  has  begun  to  analyse  the  interface  between  consumer 
protection  and  competition  with  regard  to  one  specific  form  of  price 
advertising, the effect of other types of consumer protection policies and their 
effects in other areas of consumer protection remain largely under-developed. 
While  the  two  policies  are  often  well  aligned,  the  interface  becomes 
particularly  interesting  when  the  two  policies  are  in  conflict.  For  example, 
attempts  to  improve  consumer  information  in  the  Danish  concrete  market 
also served to facilitate collusion (Albaek et al 1997). Further research in this 
regard is surely needed to inform future policy. 
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Benchmark Case Proof: 
Due  to  the  uniformity  of  firm  preferences  over  consumers’  actions  all 
messages  are  incredible,  and  the  unique  messaging  equilibrium  involves 
consumers discarding messages and firms ‘babbling ‘ over the message space. 
Thus, we can now ignore any strategic effects of messages and the conditions 
in stage 1 can be easily seen to replicate those needed to provide the Diamond 
paradox (1971). · 
 
Pricing Equilibrium Proof: 
The  derivation  of the  equilibrium  pricing  distribution  is  more  complicated 
than in standard search models, largely due to the fact that we cannot directly 
identify equilibrium profits. As we shall later verify, equilibrium profits are 
the  profits  a  firm  can  gain  by  pricing  at  the  highest  possible  price  while 
guaranteeing the trade of its local consumer,  c p+ .  
 
  c p + = q                   (3) 
 
However,  as  stated  in  (3)  this  expression  is  endogenous  and  so  we  must 
approach the derivation differently by firstly making assumption (A1) that 
states that it is never optimal for a firm to set a price that is 2c above the lower 
price boundary. We shall later show that (A1) will be true in equilibrium. 
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c p p 2 ) ( £ -                 (A1) 
 
Using  (A1)  and  (2)  we  can  arrive  at  (4)  by  noting  that  for  low  prices 
) , [ c p p p - Î   a  firm  can  assure  its  local  custom  for  prices  as  ) ( c p F - =  0. 
Further, by shifting the price support to the right by c, while subtracting c 
from each price and rearranging, we can find an expression for the ‘top’ part 
of the distribution, which we will refer to as  ) (p F  in (5). 
 
   = q ))] ( 1 ( 1 [ c p F w p + - +     for  ) , [ c p p p - Î       (4) 
  ] 1 )) /( )[( / 1 ( 1 ) ( - - - = c p w p F q   for  ) , [ p c p p + Î       (5) 
 
With  a  similar  procedure,  we  can  find  the  bottom  part  of  the  distribution 
) (p F by noting that at prices  ) , [ p c p p + Î a firm can never attract a non-local 
consumer as  )) ( 1 ( c p F + - =0, which provides (6) and then (7).  
 
  = q ))] ( 1 [( c p wF p - -        for  ) , [ p c p p + Î     (6) 
  )] 1 ( )) /( )[( / 1 ( 1 ) ( w c p w p F - - + - = q   for  ) , [ c p p p - Î     (7) 
 
Finally, if it exists, the region  ) , [ c p c p p + - Î  will be dominated by pricing at 
c p p + =  as the firm cannot attract non-locals in this region, implying (8). 
   
  )] 1 ( ) / )[( / 1 ( 1 ) ( w p w p F - - - = q     for  ) , [ c p c p p + - Î    (8) 
 
So now equations (5), (7) and (8) together constitute the full description of 
F(p) as described in the equilibrium proposition, but with  p , q and  p  still to 
be  derived  for  the  two  remaining  cases  of  w,  mid  and  high.  We  can  now 
verify our initial statement  in  (3) that  c p + = q  by setting  0 ) ( = p F  in (7).  
 
In the first case, where w is high,  ] 1 , (w wÎ  we shall later confirm that (A1) 
holds with equality;  c p p 2 ) ( = -  such that  c p c p 2 + = + =q . If we consider a 
price  ) , [ p c p p + Î
-  we know from (5) and (4) respectively, that  
 
  = q ))] ( 1 [( c p wF p - -
- -    and   = ) (p F ] 1 )) /( )[( / 1 ( - -c p w q     
 
which when combined, converges to (9) as  c p p + = ®
- q  
 
  ] )) /( )[( ( w c c - - + = q q q q               (9) 
 
which when solved implies 
 
  ] 1 1 )[ / (
2 w w c + + = q                             (10) 
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To now demonstrate that  c p p 2 ) ( = - is indeed optimal, we must show that 
any other upper bound,  c p p p 2 ~ + = ¹  provides expected profits of less than 
q . It is easy to see that  p p > ~  generates lower profits as  0 ) ( < p p  for  p p > . 
To  see  that  p p < ~ is  also  sub-optimal  consider  the  expected  profits  from 
pricing  at    p ~ ,  = q ))] ~ ( 1 [( ~ c p wF p - - .  However,  as  p p < ~ ,  )) ~ ( 1 ( c p F - -   will 
now be in the  flat region as  c p p 2 ~ < - and so  p ~  can  always be profitably 
increased until reaching   p .  
 
In the second mid w case,  p  becomes constrained by the upper limit V. This 
occurs  when  V w w c c p = + + + = ) 1 1 )( / (
2   which  when  solved  provides  the 
boundary,  )) 2 ( /( )) ( 2 ( c V V c V c w - - = . In this mid case,  ] , ( w w wÎ , (A1) now 
holds with inequality as  p  is constrained. To find q  in this case, consider a 
price 
- p  just below  p . From (3) we know that  
 
» q ))] ( 1 ( 1 [ c p F w p + - +
- -      
 
but again  )) ( 1 ( c p F + -
-  is in the flat region and so substituting for (7) and 
noting that as  c p p - = ®
- q and that  V p =  we arrive at (11), which when 
solved provides (12).  
 
))] 1 ( ) / (( 1 )[ ( w V c - - + - = q q q           (11) 
  ] 4 ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( )[ 2 / 1 (
2 wcV V w c V w c + - + + - + = q       (12) 
 
As w decreases, q  must be bounded by V, which occurs at  ) /( c V c w - = which 




Result 1 Proof:   
The probability that a consumer at firm i is deterred from search due to a false 
sales  sign  can  be  expressed  as  ∫ + - - =
p
c p dp p f c p F w ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( d   where 
dp p F d p f / ) ( ) ( = . This expression is composed of the probability that search 
would  have  been  worthwhile,  ) Pr( c p p i j - £ multiplied  by  the  probability 
that the false sales sign was not withdrawn, (1-w).  One can note that  0 = d  
for  } 1 { ] , 0 [ È Î w w .  When  ] , 0 [ w wÎ   the  pure  strategy  pricing  equilibrium 
exists,  ∫ - +
p
c p dp c p F ) ( =0 , and so all signs are ignored by the consumer, while 
when w=1, all false signs are withdrawn with certainty and so deterrence is 
impossible. For  ) , ( w w wÎ ,  0 > d and its value will depend upon whether w is 
in  the  mid  or  high  region.  In  the  high  region,       
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H dp p f c p F w
q
q d ) ( ) ( ) 1 (   which  using  the  fact  that 
))) ( /( 1 ( )) ln( )(ln / 1 ( ) ) ( /( 1 (
2 2 c p c c p p c dp c p p - - - - = - ∫   implies  that 

















w H , while in the case of mid regulation,   
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( V f c V F w dp p f c p F w
V p
c p
M - - + ∫ - - =
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Result 2 Proof:     
To show  0 ) ( ' £ w q  " w it is sufficient to show that  ) (w q is firstly, continuous 
in  w  and  then  to  show  that  0 ) ( ' £ w q   in  each  of  the  three  regions  of  w. 
Defining the profit expressions for each region of w by using a subscript r, 
r q } , , { H M L r Î " ,  one can show  ) (w q  is indeed continuous as  ) ( ) ( w w M L q q =  
and  ) ( ) ( w w H M q q =   " ) 1 , 0 ( , Î w w . It is then trivial to show that  0 ) ( ' = w L q  as 
V L = q ,  and  ] 1
) 4 ) ) 1 ( ((
) 1 (
[ ) 2 / 1 ( ) ( '




cwV V w c
V w c
V w M q   0 <   " ] 1 , 0 [ Î w , 
while  ] ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 [( ) ( '
2 / 1 2 2 2 / 1 2 w w w c w H + + - + =
- - q 0 <   " ] 1 , 0 ( Î w .To  show 
0 ) ( ' ³ w CS   " w, we express  ) (w CS  as the consumer’s maximum willingness 
to  pay  minus  the  consumers’  expected  expenditure,  minus  the  expected 
incurred search costs for any given level of regulation, w.  Making use of the 
unit demand, zero marginal cost and symmetry assumptions a consumer’s 
expenditure is equal to the expected profit of a single firm,  ) (w q . Thus, we 
once  again  using  a  subscript  r  to  denote  the  region  of  w  we  can  express 
) (w CSr =  ) Pr( ) ( Search c w V r - -q   } , , { H M L r Î " .  Again  it  is  trivial  to  show 
that  0 ) ( ' = w CSL as  0 ) ( = w CSL  in this region as firms charge the monopoly 
prices and the consumer never searches. For the mid and high regions, when 
] 1 , [w wÎ ,  we  now  show  by  contradiction  that  0 ) ( ' > w CS .  We  know  from 
above, that consumer expenditure is falling in w as  0 ) ( ' < w q   " ] 1 , [w wÎ and 
so if instead, consumer surplus was not increasing in w, then it must be the 
case  that  these  reductions  in  expenditure  must  be  offset  or  exceeded  by 
associated increases in search costs. However, this can never be true as in 
equilibrium  the  consumer  only  ever  searches  when  c p p j i + > ,  so  that  an 
increase  in  incurred  search  costs  must  be  accompanied  by  a  strictly  larger 
reduction in expenditure. Consequently,  0 ) ( ' > w CS . •  
 
 